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Abstract
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) in irrigated olive groves (IOG) in southern Spain were assessed based on farmers’ preferences 
toward these schemes. A choice experiment was used in this ex-ante assessment, with the inclusion of some innovative elements, such as 
collective participation and ecological focus areas (EFA). The results showed that farmers’ mean willingness to accept (WTA) participa-
tion in collective rather than individual AES was €124.5/ha. Their mean WTA for an additional 1% of EFA was €64.6/ha, while regarding 
the use of other agri-environmental practices, they showed a WTA of €6.3/ha and €114.7/ha for an additional 1% in the use of cover crops 
(CC) in olive grove areas and restrictive management of CC, respectively. These estimates were strongly influenced by farmers’ expecta-
tions and socio-economic characteristics, as well as farm management. We obtained that farmers’ expectations of no farm takeover reduce 
WTA for collective participation, whereas agricultural training and having at least a secondary-school education reduce farmers’ WTA 
for EFA and restrictive management of the CC, respectively. Conversely, harvesting ground olives increased farmers’ WTA for a high 
proportion of the area under CC. The analysis of the AES scenarios showed moderately high estimates of total WTA (€101-349/ha), es-
pecially when collective participation is required (€225-474/ha). The results supported the argument that there are efficient ways to en-
courage public goods provision, overcoming trade-offs with private goods provision by identifying the type of joint production.
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Introduction
The provision of public goods (PGs) is one of the 
most significant objectives of the current Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) 
and is set to remain so in the foreseeable future (EC, 
2010a). This objective is the policy response to the EU 
society’s increasing demands for environmental and 
socio-cultural public goods and services produced by 
European agriculture (EC, 2010b). Hence, CAP in-
cludes an array of instruments aimed at promoting such 
production, with Agri-environmental schemes (AES) 
one of the most important among these. AES are multi-
annual and voluntary incentive-based payments to 
farmers for preserving and enhancing environmental 
PGs. The impact of these schemes derives from both 
their aggregated expenditure assigned (22% of the 
budget of the European Rural Development Policy 
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to anticipate a future implementation of a green payment 
for permanent crops by analyzing the inclusion of EFA 
as a requisite of AES (representing a more stringent com-
mitment than the one currently enforced for arable crops 
through the annual green payment).
With regard to the type of AES contracts, collective 
participation, where farmers collectively sign AES con-
tracts, is also an issue that requires further research 
(Uthes & Matzdorf, 2013). Collective contracts represent 
a promising way of reducing transaction costs (mainly 
public) while increasing the environmental effectiveness 
of policy instruments. Specifically, increasing collective 
participation in AES reduces the number of applications 
to be processed as well as monitoring costs, consequent-
ly reducing the transaction costs incurred by the govern-
ment (Franks, 2011; Emery & Franks, 2012). Besides, if 
collective participation in AES is implemented in such a 
way that ensures the proximity (Sutherland et al., 2012) 
and the correct spatial configuration (Banerjee et al., 
2014) of the farms that form the collective, a greater 
environmental effect would also be expected. As high-
lighted by Austin et al. (2014), collective management 
of natural resources can better match the ecological scale, 
thus leading to their more efficient and sustainable man-
agement. These authors also found that a high financial 
incentive is required to promote such collective manage-
ment although did not quantify the amount. To the au-
thors' knowledge, only Kuhfuss et al. (2014) and Vil-
lanueva et al. (2015a) provide estimates of the financial 
incentive needed for such a participation for the cases of 
wineyards in southern France and olive groves in south-
ern Spain (with the former not distinguishing between 
different types of olive groves). Yet quantitative analysis 
of farmers’ WTA is still required for the efficient design 
of collective contracts. Our analysis adds estimates of 
farmers’ WTA participation in collective AES contracts 
for the case of an irrigated permanent crop.
In this paper, an analysis is carried out to better un-
derstand how farmers decide to participate in AES, with 
the inclusion of the abovementioned innovative ele-
ments: AES uptake in irrigated permanent crops, the 
inclusion of EFA as an environmental requirement and 
of collective participation in these schemes. To this end, 
the choice experiment (CE) method has been used to 
analyze farmers’ preferences toward AES for the case 
study of the irrigated olive grove (IOG) system in the 
region of Andalusia (southern Spain). Special emphasis 
is placed on analyzing the heterogeneity of preferences 
by using a random parameter logit model. In addition, 
estimates of farmers’ total WTA are provided with re-
spect to the uptake of AES for different hypothetical 
scenarios. The paper is useful for policy-makers in that 
it is strongly policy oriented and aims to identify ap-
propriate policy options for promoting agricultural PGs.
2007-2013, according to ECA, 2011); and their effi-
ciency in promoting the production of environmental 
PGs by agricultural systems (Hodge, 2013).
AES have been the subject of much attention by 
researchers (Siebert et al., 2006; Uthes & Matzdorf, 
2013). Earlier studies have focused mainly on the bar-
riers to participation in such schemes (Falconer, 2000; 
Christensen et al., 2011; Broch & Vedel, 2012), and on 
improving their design (Ruto & Garrod, 2009; Espino-
sa-Goded et al., 2010; Bartolini et al., 2011), yet there 
are still some broad issues that merit further research. 
Firstly, while there are studies that quantitatively assess 
farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) AES in herba-
ceous rainfed agricultural systems (good examples of 
such assessments include Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010, 
and Christensen et al., 2011), there is a lack of this type 
of study with respect to both permanent crops and ir-
rigated agricultural systems. Among the few studies that 
analyze AES in permanent crops, it is worth mentioning 
Villanueva et al. (2015a), who suggested the influence 
of the type of olive groves (rainfed and irrigated) on 
AES uptake. From a policy perspective, the relevance 
of taking into account the different types of agricul-
tural systems is that production of environmental PGs 
differs significantly according to the agricultural system 
in question (Cooper et al., 2009), with particularly no-
table contrasts between arable and permanent crops or 
between rainfed and irrigated systems. Different agri-
cultural systems are therefore expected to respond dif-
ferently to the implementation of AES.
In addition, the design of AES is still open to further 
research, not only with regard to the type of agri-envi-
ronmental practices to be promoted but also the type of 
contracts. As regard the former, the promotion of eco-
logical focus areas (EFA) in farmland is a relevant issue 
but one that has received little attention in the literature 
about agri-environmental policy. EFA are defined in CAP 
regulations as areas with landscape features, terraces, 
buffer strips, land lying fallow, afforested and agro-for-
estry areas, or farmland employing reduced farming in-
puts. The presence of EFA generally improves biodiver-
sity, as well as other PGs such as visual quality of 
landscapes, soil conservation, and so on (Stoate et al., 
2009; EC, 2011a). This is the main reason why the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC, 2011b) proposed a new instru-
ment in the CAP 2014-2020, known as green payment, 
for those farms fulfilling some basic environmental re-
quirements, including dedicating 7% of their farmland 
to EFA. However, this particular requirement was relaxed 
as a result of the political debate about the share of EFA, 
and in the final regulation (OJEU, 2013; Art. 43-47) this 
share was set at 5% for arable land only (permanent crops 
are eligible for this payment without any minimum EFA 
requisite). In light of this, we considered it appropriate 
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Vedel, 2012; Schulz et al., 2014) indicates its useful-
ness and validity for analyzing farmers’ preferences 
toward policy measures, especially AES. Thus, this was 
the methodological approach chosen for this analysis.
Attributes and levels
As in any other application of CE, attributes and 
levels of the good or policy under study have to be 
established. The attributes of the CE were selected with 
respect to the provision of the four abovementioned 
PGs to be promoted by the implementation of AES in 
Andalusian olive growing. As a result, six attributes 
were chosen to build possible AES, three were linked 
to agricultural management (two relating to the use of 
cover crops and one to EFA), two policy design at-
tributes and one concerning payment (see Table 1). 
The two attributes related to the use of cover crops 
(CC) were included in the CE since this practice has 
been reported as possibly the most useful agricultural 
practice in olive growing in terms of enhancing the 
production of environmental PGs (Villanueva et al., 
2014). The level of production of these PGs stemming 
from the use of CC in olive groves depends on the area 
covered and how farmers manage the CC (Barranco et 
al., 2008). Therefore, the two attributes related to the 
use of CC were Cover crops area (CCAR) and Cover 
crops management (CCMA). For the attribute CCAR, 
two levels were set: 25% and 50% of the olive grove 
area (CCAR-25% and CCAR-50%, respectively). In 
both cases, CC were supposed to be maintained for a 
period spanning at least from October to mid-March 
every year. Regarding the attribute CCMA, two levels 
were set: free (CCMA-Free) and restrictive manage-
ment (CCMA-Restr). The latter corresponds to the type 
of management set out in past AES focusing specifi-
cally on olive growing (Sub-measure 7 or SM7), and 
basically restricts the use of both tillage and herbicide 
in CC management. CCMA-Free, on the other hand, 
entails no restrictions other than those required for 
cross-compliance.
The inclusion of Ecological focus areas (EFA) as an 
attribute of the CE also met the criterion of the contri-
bution that these areas make to fostering the production 
of the four abovementioned PGs. For this attribute, two 
levels were set: 0% and 2% of the olive grove plots 
containing EFA (EFA-0% and EFA-2%, respectively). 
The first level is equivalent to the stipulated require-
ment for the green payment for permanent crops. The 
second is substantially below the 5% of EFA eventu-
ally established for arable lands in the new CAP, and 
was decided on after taking into account both the cur-
rent lack of this kind of area in Andalusian olive groves 
Material and methods
Case study
IOG in Andalusia is the irrigated permanent crop 
used as a case study in the present analysis. This agri-
cultural system is widespread in southern Europe and 
merits analysis of its specific AES design. The analysis 
of AES for IOG is particularly opportune not only due 
to IOG’s high socio-economic significance (it covers 
over half a million hectares in the region studied, 
Gómez-Limón et al., 2013), but also because of the 
numerous environmental issues that have emerged as-
sociated with the expansion and intensification of olive 
growing over the past two decades (Gómez-Limón & 
Arriaza, 2011). These negative environmental impacts 
are soil erosion, biodiversity loss, overexploitation of 
water resources, non-point water pollution and dete-
rioration of traditional landscapes. Indeed, a recent 
study of Villanueva et al. (2014) highlights the great 
scope for improving the production of environmental 
PGs through IOG. These authors found that soil fertil-
ity, visual quality of the landscape, biodiversity and 
contribution to fighting climate change are the four 
PGs with the greatest potential for improvement from 
a supply perspective. Moreover, all of these PGs are in 
high demand in European (EC, 2010b) and Andalusian 
(Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2012; 2014a; Salazar et al., 
2013) societies. Thus, it is reasonable to state that any 
AES for IOG should focus on agronomic practices 
aimed at increasing the provision of these PGs.
Choice experiment approach
A CE was used to analyze farmers’ preferences to-
ward AES. The CE is a stated preference valuation 
technique based on the Lancasterian Consumer Theo-
ry of utility maximization which postulates that con-
sumption decisions are determined by the utility or 
value derived from the attributes of the good being 
consumed (Lancaster, 1966). The econometric basis of 
the approach is the Random Utility Theory (McFadden, 
1974). For an extensive explanation of the CE theory 
and practice, see Hensher et al. (2005). CE is well 
suited to measuring the marginal value of the attributes 
of a good or policy (Ruto & Garrod, 2009). In the case 
of the latter (i.e., attributes of a certain policy such as 
AES), the underlying assumption is that farmers’ 
choices among subsidy schemes depend on the spe-
cific characteristics of subsidy schemes (Christensen 
et al., 2011). The increasing use of CE in recent spe-
cialized literature (Ruto & Garrod, 2009; Espinosa-
Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch & 
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requirements. In order to account for the possible im-
pact of monitoring and sanctions on farmers’ decision 
with regard to COLLE and the other three agri-envi-
ronmental attributes, we decided to include the attrib-
ute Monitoring (MONI). Two levels were also set for 
MONI: 5% and 20% (MONI-5% and MONI-20%). The 
lower level was set in line with the normal monitoring 
level of the CAP measures, while the higher was set to 
make the difference with respect to the lower level 
more visible to the farmers1.
For the last attribute, Payment (PAYM), four levels 
were set according to current payments in SM7 (€204-
286/ha·year). Two levels (€200/ha and €300/ha) were 
set in line with SM7 payments, while two more levels 
(€100/ha and €400/ha) were set as minimum and 
maximum payments. Farmers were reminded that AES 
payments are made in addition to direct payments. 
Finally, it is worth commenting that for every scenario 
proposed a five-year contract with no available exit-
option was set, and the minimum area for participation 
was set at the area of the largest plot.
Experimental design and data collection
A fractional factorial design and optimal orthogonal 
in the differences proposed by Street & Burgess (2007) 
was used to create a more manageable number of op-
tions, reducing the possible combinations (1924) to 192 
and the difficulties of increasing the share of EFA in 
permanent crops (Gómez-Limón & Arriaza, 2011). In 
any case, it can be assumed that the proposed 2% EFA 
could effectively entail environmental improvements 
by creating new buffer strips, vegetation boundaries 
and islets or maintaining some olive trees out of pro-
duction (which are the four elements included as EFA 
in the analysis).
The two design attributes also included in the CE 
were collective participation and level of monitoring. 
The attribute Collective participation (COLLE) was 
included due to the abovementioned expected positive 
effects that this type of participation can exert on the 
production of the environmental PGs that are the objec-
tive of the AES. The two levels of this attribute are 
straightforward, that is, collective and individual par-
ticipation. A precise definition of the former was 
needed; for participation to be considered collective, a 
group of at least five olive growers whose farms were 
located in the same municipality had to sign the same 
AES contract. It was explained to farmers that they 
were free to choose whichever group members they 
wished. Also, it was specified that if a member of the 
collective was monitored and found not to comply with 
the scheme requirements, in addition to regular sanc-
tions being imposed on that farmer (calculated, as 
usual, according to the nature and gravity of the in-
fringement), the other farmers in the collective would 
then also be monitored to ensure their compliance with 
Table 1. Attributes and levels used in the choice set design.
Attribute [Acronym] Explanation Levels
Cover crops area  
[CCAR]
Percentage of the olive grove area covered by cover crops 25%
50%
Cover crops mana-gement  
[CCMA]
Farmer’s management of the cover crops Free
Restrictive management
Ecological focus areas  
[EFA]




Collective partici-pation  
[COLLE]
Participation of a group of farmers (at least 5) with farms  













Source: Compiled by authors.
1 In the pre-test, the upper level of MONI was set at 10%. However, we noticed that farmers did not perceive a clear difference 
compared to the lower level of MONI-5%. As a result, we decided to use the higher upper level of MONI-20% to more noticeably 
mark the difference with MONI-5%, while acknowledging that such an upper level might be less realistic. This upper level proved 
to be perceived differently by the farmers and consequently was used for the CE.
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The use of CC was widespread (more than three-
quarters of the farmers used CC), although with low-
to-moderate coverage (on average, 21.7% of the olive 
groves area was devoted to CC). In fact, only 38.5% 
of the farmers used CC in over 25% of their olive grove 
plots. With regard to irrigation, farmers surveyed used 
909 m3/ha·year on average, with the vast majority using 
localized irrigation systems (mainly drip irrigation), 
and two-thirds belonging to water user associations.
The yearly average yield of farmers surveyed was 
6,352 kg of olives/ha. A considerable share of the yield 
(23.5% on average) is harvested from the ground (ol-
ives that fall directly onto the ground). The average 
CAP single payment reported was €766/ha·year.
Farmers surveyed registered an average age of 48.5 
years old and dedicate most of their time to farming 
(56.5%). They usually had a secondary school leaving 
certificate (53%), and had undergone agricultural pro-
fessional training (64%). Only 16% of farmers took up 
AES in olive growing. Around 40% of farmers did not 
anticipate a farm takeover.
Model specification: Random parameter logit 
model
As the analysis of preference heterogeneity is at the 
core of this paper, a random parameter logit (RPL) 
model was used for the econometric specification to 
analyze the choice data. The RPL model is well suited 
to analyzing preference heterogeneity since it allows 
for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution 
patterns and correlation in unobserved factors (Train, 
2003; Hensher et al., 2005). We used this continuous 
mixed logit solution (RPL model) instead of the dis-
crete one (i.e., latent class model) because we did not 
expect farmers to be grouped into homogeneous 
classes that differed from one another in function of 
preferences toward AES, but rather farmers belonging 
to a homogeneous agricultural system (IOG) where 
there is some preference heterogeneity related to farm/
farmer characteristics. A number of studies have shown 
the RPL model to be a very effective way of examining 
preference heterogeneity, especially when evaluating 
environmental PGs (Scarpa & Thiene, 2005; Rod-
ríguez-Entrena et al., 2012), and agri-environmental 
policies (Ruto & Garrod, 2009; Espinosa-Goded et al., 
profiles (D-efficiency=91.3%). This design allowed the 
analysis of main and second-order effects, though the 
latter were found to be not significant. The 192 choice 
sets were divided into 24 blocks of 8 choice-sets each, 
with one farmer answering one block. In each choice 
set, farmers were asked to choose between two alterna-
tives, in addition to a possible no-choice (Status Quo, 
SQ). The SQ alternative represented the “business as 
usual” option, i.e., the alternative with no additional 
payment for farmers apart from the direct payments 
and the one which allows them to continue using their 
current management practices in the olive groves. Fig-
ure S1 [online supplement] shows an example of a 
choice set.
A multi-stage procedure was employed for sampling. 
In the first stage, five Andalusian agricultural districts2 
were selected from a total of 52, using a proportional 
random procedure according to olive grove area. This 
sample of districts covers 453,682 ha and accounts for 
31% of the Andalusian olive groves. In the next stage of 
the procedure, at least 60 personal interviews were con-
ducted per district (randomly selecting 10 towns for each 
district), as a result of which 330 completed question-
naires were obtained, 117 for IOG. Of these 117, 13 were 
considered to be protests3, reducing the total number of 
valid interviews to 104 (832 choices). Interviews were 
carried out from October 2013 to January 2014. A cheap 
talk was used to ensure that farmers understood cor-
rectly before answering the questionnaire.
Description of farmers surveyed
Farm and farmer characteristics of the sample were 
roughly in line with previous surveys of IOG in Anda-
lusia (e.g., Gómez-Limón & Arriaza, 2011). Most of the 
farms surveyed were located in Jaen, with a smaller 
number in Cordoba and Malaga. Their average olive 
grove area was 24.4 ha, more than three-quarters of 
which was irrigated. The age of the olive groves was 
around 60 years old and they had 137 olive trees/ha on 
average, with 2.4 stems/tree. The olive groves were for 
the most part located on low-to-moderate slopes and 
0.65% of their area was dedicated to EFA.
Most farmers surveyed use conventional olive–grow-
ing techniques (55.8%), while the vast majority of the 
remaining farmers use integrated techniques (42.3%). 
2 Campiña Norte and La Loma (province of Jaen), La Sierra and Campiña Alta (province of Cordoba), and Norte (province of Malaga).
3 Those who chose the SQ-option in all the choice sets without considering the alternative AES proposed in each (i.e., did not make 
trade-offs among alternatives but directly chose the SQ-option) were considered protesters. The most often cited reasons for always 
choosing the SQ-option can be classified as non-acceptance of the valuation context (e.g., rejection of the idea of a complementary 
environmental subsidy, lack of trust in the implementing institution, etc.). This definition of protesters has also been used in previous 
studies (e.g., Christensen et al., 2011).
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where At = (Alt A, Alt B, SQ) is the choice set, λ is a 
scale parameter, and φ(·) is the normal density of the 
error component (ηj) which equals zero when j = SQ. 
This equation cannot be evaluated analytically because 
the choice probability does not have a closed form. 
Hence it is approximated using simulation methods; in 
this paper we used 200 Halton draws. In the EC_RPL 
model used here, all attributes were assumed to follow 
a normal distribution, except for PAYM and MONI 
which were assumed to be non-random.
To capture observed heterogeneity in farmers’ pref-
erences, the EC_RPL model included interactions of 
the attributes and the ASCSQ with farm and farmer 
characteristics. The final model was obtained using a 
three-step procedure. First, following an iterative 
routine significant interactions were explored using 
EC_RPL model with a single interaction of one non-
monetary attribute (except MONI as it soon proved 
to be non-significant) with one variable. More than 
200 different single-interaction models were gener-
ated for each sub-system. Second, multiple-interaction 
models were explored using different combinations 
of the interactions that had been found to be signifi-
cant in the first step. As a result, more than 150 
multiple-interaction models were generated. From 
these, the selection was made by simultaneously ob-
serving the level of significant parameters, goodness-
of-fit statistics, and model parsimony. In the third 
step, after having selected the multiple-interaction 
model, interactions with the ASCSQ were added and 
the final model was selected using the same three 
criteria. As a final result of this procedure, the fol-
lowing four interactions with attributes and two in-
teractions with the ASCSQ were included in the final 
EC_RPL model: 
–  CCAR×Groundharv, which represents the interac-
tion between the CCAR attribute and the share of 
olives harvested from the ground;
–  CCMA×Educa2, which represents the interaction 
between the CCMA attribute and the dichotomous 
variable of secondary education (a score of 1 as-
signed if the farmer attended secondary school or 
higher);
–  EFA×No-training, which represents the interaction 
between the EFA attribute and the dichotomous 
variable of agricultural professional training (a 
score of 1 assigned if the farmer has undergone 
professional training);
–  COLLE×No-takeover, which represents the inter-
action between the COLLE attribute and the di-
chotomous variable of farmers’ perception about 
farm takeover (a score of 1 assigned if the farmer 
does not anticipate a farm takeover);
2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch & Vedel, 2012). 
This study uses a specific version of the RPL model, 
the Error Component RPL (EC_RPL) model, which 
includes an additional random error component in the 
utility function to capture the error variance common 
to both A and B (i.e., it accounts for the fact that re-
spondents may treat the hypothetical AES-alternatives 
[A, B] differently to the SQ) (Scarpa et al., 2007). The 
EC_RPL model has previously been used in this type 
of analysis (Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Broch & 
Vedel, 2012), confirming its suitability for this purpose.
The econometric specification of the model is pro-
vided below. In the EC_RPL model, the utility function 
associated with each alternative is expressed as fol-
lows:
 UAlt A = ßχ + ηNon_SQ + ε [1]
 UAlt B = ßχ + ηNon_SQ + ε [2]
 USQ = ASCSQ + ßχ + γS + ε [3]
where χ is a vector representing the attributes, β is the 
vector of coefficients associated with these attributes 
(reflecting individual preferences and heterogeneity 
that can be explained by individual –farm and/or 
farmer– characteristics), ε is the random error terms, 
ηNon_SQ is the additional error component that captures 
the correlation between the non SQ alternatives, as-
suming normal distribution [ηNon_SQ ~ N(0, σ2)], γS 
captures heterogeneity in preferences toward choosing 
the SQ option explained by a set of individual charac-
teristics, and ASCSQ is the alternative-specific constant 
for the SQ choice. The ASCSQ represents the utility not 
captured by the attributes and the reason for its inclu-
sion is to account for SQ bias, as otherwise this bias 
would be captured by the attribute parameters (Ada-
mowicz et al., 1998). As in Horne (2006) and Espino-
sa-Goded et al. (2010), we interpret the ASCSQ as 
likely representing farmers’ attitude toward AES. β is 
randomly distributed in the population following a 
density function f (βn│θ), where θ represents the dis-
tribution parameters. ε random error terms follow a 
Gumbel distribution and have been assumed constant 
among the different choices made by each individual. 
Thus, choices are modelled following a panel structure. 
For panel data, the integer probability involves a prod-
uct of logit formulas (Train, 2003). The joint probabil-
ity of respondent n choosing alternative i in each of the 
T choice situations is given by:
 P[t(n)] =
= ∫ß ∫η ΠTt=1 
exp(λ( ′βnχ ti +ηin ))
∑ j⊂At ( ′βnχ ti +η jn ))
 f (βn│θ) dβ · φ(0,σ2) d ηjn
[4]
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(CCMA-Restr, CCAR-50% and EFA-2%) but with 
individual and collective participation respectively. 
Finally, there was also an intermediate scenario, 
EFAM_25, with CCMA-Restr, CCAR-25%, and EFA-
2%. In all scenarios, MONI remained constant at 5%, 
since it was not significant in the EC_RPL model. Fi-
nally, we assumed that a farmer would participate in a 
certain AES scenario if the level of payment was equal 
to or higher than the disutility (in absolute terms) ex-
perienced by the farmer (i.e., total WTA) as a result of 
participating in such AES.
Results
Irrigated olive groves farmers’ preferences 
toward AES
The results of the EC_RPL model are presented in 
Table 3. As can be observed, the model was highly 
significant and fitted well, as shown by the main good-
ness-of-fit statistics (pseudo-R2=0.441; LL=-496.5). 
The data in Table 3 showed all but one of the attributes 
to be highly significant determinants of choice; all the 
coefficients showed a statistical significance level of 
5% or less (with the exception of MONI) and had the 
expected sign (negative coefficient in all cases except 
PAYM, reflecting farmers’ disutility –or utility in 
case of PAYM). MONI was the attribute that received 
the least attention from farmers, indicating that 
the level of monitoring played a minor role in their 
choices.
The results of the EC_RPL model showed a high 
heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences toward AES. This 
statement is supported by the following results: all 
standard deviations of the random parameters were 
significant, indicating that preferences varied signifi-
cantly within the population; all the interaction param-
eters (socio-economic variables interacted with the at-
–  ASCSQ×Oliarea20, which represents farm size (a 
score of 1 assigned when the olive grove area 
exceeds 20 ha);
–  ASCSQ×SinglePaym750, which represents single 
payment received (a score of 1 assigned when 
the average single payment to the farm exceeds 
€750/ha per year).
Farmers’ welfare analysis
In CEs, marginal rates of substitution between non-
monetary attributes and the monetary attribute are 
estimated by calculating the ratio of the coefficient of 
the former to the negative of the coefficient of the lat-
ter [WTANM = -(βNM / βM)]. These are also called the 
“implicit prices”, representing the WTA for a 1% or 1 
unit increase in the quantity of the attribute in question, 
if quantitative (e.g., area of EFA), or for a discrete 
change in the attribute (e.g., from free to restrictive 
CCMA) if qualitative. Additionally, to provide a 
broader picture of the required payments for different 
AES scenarios and to estimate adoption rates in terms 
of farmers and area, total WTA was estimated for dif-
ferent AES scenarios. Individual total WTA related to 
AES scenarios (V1), which change several attribute 
levels simultaneously, with respect to the status quo 
(V0) was estimated following Hanemann (1984).
The six hypothesized AES scenarios that were used 
for the analysis are shown in Table 2. They repre-
sented different alternatives of AES, with different 
combinations of the attributes. There were three mini-
mally restrictive scenarios, namely EFA_2, which only 
included the EFA-2% requisite; M_25, comprising 
CCMA-Restr and CCAR-25% (in line with past SM7); 
and EFA_25, which represented AES with CCAR-25% 
and EFA-2%. There were two highly restrictive sce-
narios, AES_Max and AES_MaxC, which represented 
AES with all the attributes at their highest levels 
Table 2. Scenarios of agri-environmental schemes considered for the analysis1. 
Scenario COLLE CCMA EFA MONI CCAR
EFA_2 0 0 2 5 0
M_25 0 1 0 5 25
EFA_25 0 0 2 5 25
EFAM_25 0 1 2 5 25
AES_Max 0 1 2 5 50
AES_MaxC 1 1 2 5 50
1 COLLE=0 and COLLE=1 represent individual and collective participation, respectively; CCMA=0 
and CCMA=1 represent free and restrictive cover crops management, respectively; EFA=0 and EFA=2 
represent 0% and 2% of olive grove area devoted to ecological focus areas; MONI=5 represent 5% of 
olive grove farms are monitored; CCAR=0, CCAR=25, and CCAR=50 represent 0%, 25%, and 50% 
of the olive grove area covered by cover crops, respectively.  Source: Compiled by authors.
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With regard to CCMA, the results showed a moder-
ately high WTA for this attribute (€115.2/ha), indicat-
ing that IOG farmers had a very negative perception of 
managing CC without tillage and with a very restrictive 
use of herbicides. Yet when farmers had at least a 
secondary-school education, their WTA fell (€66.5/ha), 
and the opposite is true for farmers who had not 
reached this level of education (€170.1/ha). 
Regarding EFA, an average WTA of €64.6/ha was 
registered per 1% increase in EFA in the olive grove 
area. Agricultural training played a role in farmers’ 
preferences toward EFA given that when they under-
went training, their WTA fell to €45.9/ha, whereas it 
reached €97.1/ha when they did not. 
Average IOG farmers’ WTA for COLLE was 
€124.5/ha. We found that when farmers did not an-
ticipate a farm takeover, they were more willing to 
participate in AES collectively and their WTA was 
reduced to €72.4/ha as a result. The opposite is also 
true, namely, their WTA increased to €160.1/ha if they 
thought there would be a farm takeover. It is worth 
outlining here some qualitative information about 
COLLE gathered from the interviews. Some of the most 
repeated statements about collective participation 
showed skepticism about its usefulness in enhancing 
environmental performance and concerns about the 
possible intrusion of other farmers into their farm man-
tributes) were significant, indicating that preferences 
across farmers toward each attribute varied as a function 
of certain farmers’ socio-economic characteristics; and 
covariates interacting with ASCSQ (i.e., SinglePaym750 
and Oliarea20) were also significant, reflecting the fact 
that general farmers’ willingness to uptake AES (that 
is, their willingness to choose AES alternatives instead 
of SQ) also depended on farm characteristics.
Results of the attributes and their interactions can 
be better appreciated by observing Table 4, which 
shows mean WTA estimates for the whole sample and 
for specific profiles (elicited from the interactions) of 
the farmers identified as the most and the least willing 
to participate in AES. As regards the attribute CCAR, 
mean IOG farmers’ WTA is €6.2/ha per 1% increase in 
the olive grove area covered by CC. However, we 
found that there was a significant negative interaction 
between CCAR and the share of ground olives over the 
total volume of olives harvested (Groundharv). Accord-
ingly, farmers’ WTA for CCAR fell to €2.8/ha for those 
farmers who did not harvest ground olives at all (see 
most-willing farmer profile in Table 4). The main rea-
son for such an interaction is that, in general, farmers 
would not be willing to reach high levels of CCAR 
(e.g., the levels used in the CE, CCAR-25% and 
CCAR-50%) as it would hinder the harvesting of 
ground olives. 
Table 3. Error component random parameter logit model.
Parameter1
Mean values Standard deviations
Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error
CCAR (Cover crops area) -0.038 * 0.017 0.097 *** 0.016
CCAR×Groundharv -0.002 *** 0.000
CCMA (Cover crops management) -2.303 *** 0.531 1.956 *** 0.397
CCMA×Educa2 1.403 * 0.682
EFA (Ecological focus areas) -0.621 ** 0.226 0.867 *** 0.156
EFA×No-training -0.695 * 0.279
COLLE (Collective participation) -2.168 *** 0.413 1.706 *** 0.350
COLLE×No-takeover 1.187 * 0.584
MONI (Level of monitoring) -0.009 0.012
PAYM (Payment) 0.014 *** 0.001
ASCSQ -3.563 *** 0.917
ηNo SQ 3.519 *** 0.581
Covariates
ASCSQ×Oliarea20 -2.453 ** 0.910
ASCSQ×SinglePaym750 2.163 * 0.946
Log-likelihood=-887.7
McFadden Pseudo-R2 = 0.441
Valid respondents/choices: 102/816
1 Groundharv: share of olives harvested from the ground; Educa2: having at least a secondary-school 
education; No-training: having undergone professional training; No-takeover: not anticipating a farm 
takeover; Oliarea20: olive grove area exceeds 20 ha; SinglePaym750: average single payment to the 
farm exceeds €750/ha·year; ASCSQ: alternative-specific constant for the status quo choice.  *, **, and *** 
reflect significance level of 5%, 1%, and 0.1% respectively.   Source: Compiled by authors.
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further insight about the initial attitude of IOG farmers 
when deciding whether to participate in AES or not. The 
interaction ASCSQ×Oliarea20 was significant and negative, 
which means that those farms with more than 20 ha of 
olive groves (Oliarea20=1) were less likely to choose SQ 
and were generally more willing to participate in AES. 
The interaction ASCSQ×SinglePaym750, which was sig-
nificant and positive, indicates that farmers with average 
single payments of more than €750/ha·year were less 
willing to participate in AES.
Farmers’ total WTA related to scenarios of 
agri-environmental schemes
Table 5 shows estimates of farmers’ total WTA re-
garding each scenario. Total WTA of IOG farmers 
ranged from €100.8/ha for the least stringent individ-
ual-AES scenario considered (i.e., EFA_2) to €349.1/
ha for the most stringent one (AES_Max). When col-
lective participation was considered, €124.5/ha had to 
be added to each scenario (e.g., this is the difference 
between the total WTA of AES_Max and AES_MaxC, 
with the latter being €473.6/ha on average).
Table 5. Mean farmers’ total willingness to accept (WTA) for 
different scenarios of agri-environmental schemes, in €/ha.







*** reflects significance level of 0.1%. Source: Compiled by authors.
agement. Farmers also expressed concerns about the issue 
of the setting-up of groups. In this respect, most of the 
farmers thought that producers’ cooperatives could act 
as a collective in the AES contract, suggesting an active 
role in the creation of groups. In addition, it is worth 
pointing out that the sanction system revealed to be cru-
cial for farmers to accept collective participation. In the 
pre-test, a tougher sanction system was included, linking 
individual to collective compliance. Almost all farmers 
interviewed in the pre-test refused to participate collec-
tively, primarily as they considered monetary punishment 
due to non-compliance by other farmers to be unfair.
With respect to MONI, the main finding is that farm-
ers were barely aware of it when it came to choosing 
whether to participate in AES or not. The qualitative 
information collected during the survey pointed to two 
different reasons that could explain such low WTA for 
high-level monitoring, namely the willingness to comply 
with the requisites (expecting “fair” monitoring) and the 
adoption of strategic behavior (i.e., not willing to comply 
but assuming that they would not be fully monitored).
It is also worth highlighting the results for ASCSQ. The 
fact that its coefficient was significant and negative indi-
cates, respectively, that there were also other sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity not taken into account in the 
model, and that olive growers were generally more will-
ing to participate than not (that is, there was a negative 
willingness to choose SQ-option). During the interviews, 
two main reasons were found to explain such a positive 
attitude: the fact that a certain number of farmers already 
complied some requisites of the AES-alternatives or per-
ceived the changes proposed not to be too drastic, and the 
fact that some farmers adopted a ‘rent seeking’ behavior, 
so they preferred AES-alternatives because of the related 
payment. The two interactions with the ASCSQ provided 







CCAR (Cover crops area) 6.3 ***  1.0  2.8  17.2
CCMA (Cover crops management) 114.7 *** 25.3 66.5 170.1
EFA (Ecological focus areas) 64.6 *** 12.4 45.9  97.1
COLLE (Collective participation) 124.5 *** 25.0 72.4 160.1
MONI (Level of monitoring) 0.7  0.9  0.7   0.7
1 In the case of EFA, MONI and CCAR, it is EUR per 1% of olive groves area assigned to EFA, 1% 
of farms monitored, and 1% of olive groves area with cover crops, respectively.  2 Estimates were cal-
culated using the mean values of the variables included as interactions with the attributes.  3 Farmers-
most-willing to participate in AES: 0% of olives harvested from the ground; have at least a second-
ary school education; have undergone some professional training; do not anticipate farm takeover. 
Farmers-least-willing profile is the opposite (i.e., 100% of olives harvested from the ground, do not 
have at least a secondary school education, etc.).  *, **, and *** reflect significance level of 5%, 1%, and 
0.1% respectively.  Source: Compiled by authors.
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Figure 2 shows budget estimates for the implemen-
tation of each scenario according to the level of pay-
ment, arrived at by multiplying the latter by the en-
rolled area for each payment. For example, if a payment 
of €150/ha were set for the implementation of AES 
M_25, 218,194 ha of IOG would be enrolled, requiring 
a total budget of €50.7M. Logically, the less stringent 
scenarios would imply higher budgets, given that the 
participation rate would be higher.
Discussion
Policy-makers face a great challenge when designing 
AES for IOG, given the large heterogeneity of the 
preferences of farmers. This study proffers support to 
AES design by providing valuable information about 
AES uptake. In this way, this section addresses: a) a 
Figure 1 shows the rate of participation in AES both 
in terms of percentage of farmers and percentage of 
area for the different scenarios considered and for dif-
ferent payments. Clearly, the participation rate (in terms 
of both farmers and area) changed depending on the 
scenario considered. For example, at the €150/ha-
level of payment, 15% and 66% of the farmers would 
be willing to participate in AES_MaxC and EFA_2, 
respectively, which corresponded to the minimum and 
maximum rate obtained for the six scenarios. For any 
area-payment the participation rate was higher in terms 
of area than in number of farmers, reflecting the cor-
relation found between farm size and AES uptake.
With respect to farmers’ participation, it must be noted 
that the more stringent the AES requisites, the less sen-
sitive farmers were to payments. While participation 
rates in the most stringent AES considered (AES_MaxC) 
for €0-400/ha of payment reaches 38% (ranging from 
0% for €0/ha to 38% for €400/ha), the rest of the sce-
narios considered range from 46% to 80%. Furthermore, 
Figure 1 shows the participation rate with a payment of 
€0/ha, representing the percentage of farmers and area 
using the practices that were to be encouraged through 
AES (i.e., percentage of farmers/area providing PGs at 
the level established in the AES without any incentive). 
Literature uses the term “deadweight” to refer to a 
policy measure that funds something (e.g., the use of an 
agricultural practice) that would have existed (been 
implemented) in the absence of such a measure. For 
example, for M_25 the deadweight would be 30% of 
farmers (representing 47% of the area), indicating that 
30% of the farmers complied with the requisites in-
cluded in this AES without receiving any payment for 
it. In contrast, deadweight was much lower for more 
stringent AES (e.g., for AES_Max it was 8% and 19% 
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Figure 1. Participation in different scenarios of agri-environmental schemes and payments. Source: Compiled by authors.
Figure 2. Budget estimates for each scenario of agri-environ-
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permanent elements such as trees). Moreover, compar-
ing IOG to rainfed olive groves (see Villanueva et al., 
2015a), IOG shows a higher WTA than the latter 
likely due to higher opportunity costs.
Regarding COLLE, the estimation of farmers’ WTA 
for collective participation is almost lacking in the 
literature. To the authors’ knowledge, only Kuhfuss et 
al. (2014), for wine growers in southern Spain, and 
Villanueva et al. (2015a) provide WTA estimates for 
such participation. Kuhfuss et al. (2014) obtain that 
farmers have a WTA of €135-189/ha per year for col-
lective participation. Since they include a “collective 
bonus” of €150/ha for the 5-years AES contract (i.e., 
€30/ha per year), it could be argued that wine growers 
disutility associated with collective participation is 
around €105-159/ha per year. Although collective par-
ticipation is not equally defined in both, their study and 
ours, and the approach taken differs (e.g., they used a 
conditional bonus for collective participation), it is 
worth noting that our estimates (i.e., €125/ha on aver-
age) fall within theirs. In the comparison with Vil-
lanueva et al. (2015a), the estimates of IOG farmers’ 
WTA for COLLE are closer to those obtained in that 
study for the olive grower-types with the lowest WTA, 
suggesting that IOG shows a lower WTA for COLLE 
compared to rainfed olive groves.
With respect to MONI, the results indicating that the 
level of monitoring barely influenced farmers’ partici-
pation in AES appears to be counterintuitive and con-
tradicts literature on AES uptake. In fact, Broch & 
Vedel (2012) estimated farmers’ WTA of €38/ha per 
1% absolute increase in the level of monitoring in AES 
in Denmark. Thus, the results obtained indicate a dif-
ferent behavior of the IOG farmers regarding prefer-
ences toward the level of monitoring in AES. In order 
to clarify to what extent significant disutility to higher 
levels of monitoring in AES can be expected, future 
research could focus on the reasons behind this differ-
ent behavior. Future research should confirm to what 
extent the two abovementioned reasons –i.e., willing-
ness to comply with the requisites and strategic behav-
ior– are operating behind IOG farmers’ preferences 
toward the level of monitoring in AES.
Joint production and collective participation: 
Policy implications
For CCAR, CCMA and EFA, trade-offs between the 
provision of private goods and PGs become apparent, at 
least through the farmers’ eyes. The main challenge for 
the policy-maker is to overcome such trade-offs, and this 
requires a thorough understanding of how both kinds of 
goods are produced. For instance, in the case of CCAR, 
general discussion of the results comparing them to 
previous studies; b) the main policy implications drawn 
from the attributes analyzed; and c) the main policy 
implications linked to the analysis of AES scenarios.
Attributes of agri-environmental schemes: 
Previous evidences
The results are generally in line with previous studies. 
They suggest a high heterogeneity of farmers’ prefer-
ences toward AES, mirroring the results obtained by 
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010), Christensen et al. (2011), 
and Broch & Vedel (2012), and reinforcing the relation-
ships suggested by Villanueva et al. (2015a) for the olive 
groves (considering rainfed and irrigated ones at the 
same time) within the same region. Actually, the interac-
tions included in the EC_RPL model suggest that there 
are many factors behind the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences that determine farmers’ AES uptake, particularly 
farm management (CCAR×Groundharv) and character-
istics (ASCSQ×Oliarea20 and ASCSQ×SinglePaym750), 
and farmers’ features (CCMA×Educa2 and EFA×No-
training) and expectations (COLLE×No-takeover). These 
factors have largely been highlighted previously by the 
specialized literature (Falconer, 2000; Siebert et al., 
2006; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Ruto & Garrod, 2009; 
Rodríguez-Entrena & Arriaza, 2013; Uthes & Matzdorf, 
2013; Rodríguez-Entrena et al., 2014b).
It is also worth discussing some specific results with 
regard to the attributes. For instance, the results (espe-
cially those related to the attribute CCMA) indicate 
strong farmers’ preferences toward flexibility concern-
ing agri-environmental practices, which has also been 
pointed out by Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) and Chris-
tensen et al. (2011). Yet, whereas the IOG farmers’ 
WTA is moderately high for CCMA (€115/ha on aver-
age), it is not as high as that of some types of olive 
growers in Villanueva et al. (2015a) (with 3 out of 4 
olive grower-types showing average WTA higher than 
€190/ha), suggesting that IOG can more easily adopt 
this soil conservation measure than rainfed olive 
groves.
With regard to EFA the estimates of WTA (mean of 
€64.6/ha) are, as expected, notably above those ob-
tained by Schulz et al. (2014) for the use of EFA by 
German farmers in their arable land (with WTA of 
€9-51/ha). Such a discrepancy in the WTA estimates 
can be attributed to the different types of agricultural 
systems analyzed: arable crops in the case of Schulz et 
al. (2014) and permanent crops in the present study. 
Implicit spatial restrictions related to permanent crops 
seem to have the effect of raising farmers’ WTA (i.e., 
it is much easier to comply with EFA in the absence of 
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generally worried about the presence of resistant weed 
species within CC (and thus have a negative perception 
of the reduction of permitted options for managing CC), 
and that many farmers consider tillage a useful way to 
reduce soil water evaporation during summertime. As 
a result, CCMA-Restr appears very stringent to most 
olive growers, who consequently require moderate-to-
high compensation to comply with such a requisite. 
Therefore, the large budget required to implement 
CCMA-Restr in IOG means that policy-makers should 
only consider this practice in special circumstances 
(e.g., in environmentally-sensitive areas).
With respect to EFA, there is also a moderately high 
WTA. Yet when observing farmers’ total WTA associ-
ated with EFA_2 scenario (€100.8/ha), it seems that 30% 
of direct payments assigned in the new CAP regulation 
to green payments (equivalent to €229.8/ha on average 
for the farms surveyed5) would be enough to encourage 
the acceptance of a green payment if EFA_2 was con-
sidered as a requirement in IOG. In fact, a payment of 
€229.8/ha would result in a participation rate of 85% 
and 95% in terms of farmers and area, respectively. So, 
in this scenario it seems that a vast majority of IOG 
farmers would be substantially rewarded for a modest 
additional commitment to the environment. Nevertheless, 
for higher shares of EFA (e.g., 5-7%), it is unlikely that 
such a level of payments would be enough for farmers 
to apply for green payment. Indeed, assuming linear 
WTA for the interval of 0 to 7% of EFA, estimates of 
total WTA for the scenarios EFA_5 and EFA_7 (equiv-
alent to the 5% set for EFA in arable crops in the CAP 
regulation, which may be increased to 7% in 2017) 
would be €300 and €427.4/ha, respectively, well above 
the likely green payment in IOG (€229.8/ha). However, 
linear WTA is a strong assumption with regard to EFA, 
given that IOG farmers’ WTA would probably rise as 
the share of EFA increases. Therefore, although there is 
room for devoting some part of IOG land to EFA (e.g., 
0-3%), it would be very difficult for farmers to comply 
with higher shares of EFA. Finally, it is worth noting 
that EFA is analyzed here as a requisite of a multian-
nual scheme which is in addition to direct payments (and 
which represents a more stringent commitment than the 
one currently enforced in direct payments for arable 
crops, through the green payment). However, it would 
two different production relationships emerge. For low 
CCAR (e.g., CCAR lower than 25%), there appears to 
be no trade-off, but rather a complementary relationship 
between production of private goods and PGs. In this 
regard, the study shows that three-quarters of farmers use 
CC with an average CCAR of 21%, since they consider 
CC useful, primarily for preventing soil erosion and by 
extension, the long-term sustainability of the farms. These 
figures reflect the outcome of efforts made (principally 
through training and awareness campaigns) by the An-
dalusian Regional Government and professional asso-
ciations to encourage the use of CC. These efforts should 
now focus on the remaining one-quarter of farmers that 
do not use CC. However, for a higher CCAR (e.g., CCAR 
higher than 25%) the trade-off becomes evident, since 
farmers consider it a handicap for ground olive harvest-
ing. In this case, it is important to understand why farm-
ers harvest ground olives and to seek a possible alterna-
tive solution. The harvest of ground olives is a 
widely-used practice due to its lower cost (at least for 
traditional olive groves) and workforce availability4. 
However, olive oil obtained from these olives is of a low 
quality and as a result, the olive oil industry usually pays 
less for ground-harvested olives. Therefore, an alternative 
solution to overcome such a trade-off might be a market 
incentive to encourage the olive oil industry to establish 
a quality premium for early harvesting directly from the 
tree; for instance, implementing public promotion cam-
paigns favoring the consumption of “virgin and extra-
virgin olive oil” (obtained from olives directly harvested 
from the tree) instead of simply “olive oil” (obtained from 
olives harvested from the tree or the ground). Alterna-
tively, R&D activities focused on developing cheaper 
technologies for harvesting olives from the trees could 
be promoted. Thus, by identifying the type and causes of 
the joint production, policy-makers can easily identify 
efficient ways to encourage PGs provision, overcoming 
trade-offs with private goods provision.
With regard to CCMA and EFA, competitive rela-
tionships likely characterize the joint production of 
private goods and PGs. In the case of the CCMA, the 
relatively high estimated WTA points to farmers’ low 
willingness to manage CC without tilling and/or with 
restrictions on the number of herbicide treatments. Two 
main reasons behind these results are that farmers are 
4 It is worth noting that this practice is mostly used in family-run farms, which make up the vast majority of IOG farms. So, the 
low costs of harvesting ground olives can be explained by the fact that family labor is frequently not accounted for by the farmer 
when deciding whether or not to harvest these olives. Coupled to this, another reason for harvesting ground olives is the fact that 
farmers can harvest these olives during a longer period of time than tree olives, thus allowing them to more easily adapt their (family) 
workforce to harvesting and other farm tasks.
5 This figure is estimated as the 30% of the per-hectare single payment received on average by the surveyed farmers, which can be 
claimed to be a good approximation of the average green payment likely to be received by IOG farmers since they barely receive 
other direct payment but the single payment. It is worth mentioning that, as a result of the CAP reform, a decrease in the direct 
payments received by olive growers is expected in the coming years, although the exact decrease is unknown yet.
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There are some issues of collective participation 
that require further research. Firstly, further research 
is needed to estimate gains from the collective par-
ticipation in AES and find the necessary information 
to set the appropriate bonus. In this regard, while 
expected gains from the reduction of transaction costs 
could easily be estimated, those deriving from im-
proved environmental performance are far more dif-
ficult to quantify as they depend not only on the req-
uisites/practices included in the AES, but also the 
proximity and configuration of enrolled farmland 
(Sutherland et al., 2012; Banerjee et al., 2014). These 
facts are evidence that an up-to-30% bonus may be 
too rough an estimation to reflect society’s net gains 
from collective participation. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to further analyze other forms of incentives, 
such as non-monetary ones (e.g., giving priority to 
collective rather than individual applications to AES), 
or simply not offering individual AES but only collec-
tive contracts. Future research should also provide 
information about how farmers’ preferences toward 
collective AES can be influenced by the level of col-
laboration and spatial restrictions when forming the 
collective (e.g., only allowing neighboring farms to 
collaborate).
Scenarios of agri-environmental schemes
The analysis of the AES scenarios shows moder-
ately high average estimates of total WTA (€101-349/
ha), especially when collective participation is required 
(€225-474/ha). Accordingly, this requires a sizable 
budget when extrapolating to the whole IOG system 
in Andalusia. This is not surprising since IOG is char-
acterized by semi-intensive farming, that is, it is 
largely oriented to the production of private goods. As 
a result, IOG farmers face high opportunity costs when 
asked to increase their production of PGs and thus high 
payments are usually required to outweigh these costs 
and incentivize AES uptake. Although these results a 
priori suggest that the implementation of AES in IOG 
is not advisable, further analysis should be carried out 
in order to confidently make such a recommendation. 
First, there are some issues that will have to be incor-
porated into future supply-side analysis in order to 
provide more accurate estimates. This analysis should 
be expanded by estimating the transaction costs (at 
least for the implementing body) associated with the 
implementation of AES, and by incorporating possible 
market effects (namely changes in commodity prices) 
on farmers’ preferences toward AES. Moreover, it is 
worth underlining that here we are comparing welfare 
changes from the SQ situation to the hypothetical 
be interesting to analyze to what extent WTA estimates 
would vary if EFA were considered as part of a annual 
direct payment scheme, such as the green payment. Due 
the different time commitment, WTA estimates would 
presumably decrease for green payment but further re-
search is needed to confirm this.
With regard to COLLE, there are several policy 
implications that can be drawn from the results. 
Firstly, the EU-wide up-to-30% bonus set in the CAP 
2014-2020 regulations does not appear to be enough 
to promote collective participation in IOG. In any of 
the scenarios considered, adding 30% to total WTA 
estimates would not surpass the €124.5/ha needed for 
collective participation. However, our results indicate 
that olive growers’ WTA for collective participation 
is sensitive to the stringency of sanction system spe-
cifically designed for this participation and to farmers’ 
expectations about their farm takeover. With regard to 
the former, IOG farmers refused collective participa-
tion particularly when monetary sanctions due to other 
farmers defaulting were imposed. While this calls for 
a careful design of the sanction system in collective 
AES, further research is needed to inform such a de-
sign, the main challenge being to find sanction systems 
that encourage group self-control of moral hazard but 
do not totally discourage farmers’ participation in col-
lective AES. With regard to farmers’ expectations of 
farm takeover, the 30% bonus is more likely to be 
enough to encourage the farmers’ collective participa-
tion in AES when they anticipate a farm takeover. This 
information can be used in policy design; for instance, 
when a known successor is expected to take over farm 
management, not only the predecessor but also the 
successor should be involved in the process of signing 
collective contracts (informing both parties, including 
a specific clause addressing the issue, etc.). Also, the 
usefulness of collective participation in enhancing 
environmental performance must be disseminated to 
farmers to overcome their skeptical attitudes, since 
they represent a barrier to such participation (Emery 
& Franks, 2012). In addition, the link underlined by 
the farmers between group creation and producer co-
operatives suggests the use of these organizations as 
facilitators to that task. As highlighted by Franks 
(2011), the use of facilitators is key to creating groups 
in collective/collaborative AES. These cooperatives 
normally embody a common trusted platform for the 
setting-up of groups, providing information to farmers 
(e.g., about other farmers), which Banerjee et al. 
(2014) highlight as vital for engaging farmers in this 
type of collective scheme. Therefore, results suggest 
that it would be recommendable to identify these fa-
cilitators and take them into account when designing 
collective AES.
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